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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most enduring principles of economics is attributed to a
letter Thomas Gresham wrote to Queen Elizabeth I near the beginning of
her reign, probably in 1559, about one of the most pressing problems
facing the country.' That sixteenth-century principle (commonly and
incorrectly stated as "bad money drives out good money"2) has relevance to
legal education in the twenty-first century. It may, for example, explain
* Dean and Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. I am grateful
to my friends and colleagues who assisted with the preparation of this article, William
Aceves, Bucky Askew, Tom Barton, Dan Freehling, Bill Rakes, Don Shapiro, Lera
Smith, Liz Stevens, Rennard Strickland, Debbie Wilson and Peter Winograd. The
remaining errors are a result of not having taken some of their advice.
1.

RAYMOND DE ROOVER, GRESHAM ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE 15 (Harvard Univ.

Press 1949).
2. There are as many formulations of Gresham's Law as there are economists.
See Robert Mundell, Uses and Abuses of Gresham's Law in the History of Money, 2
ZAGREB J.ECON. 3, 6-10 (1998) (describing several "faulty renderings" of Gresham's
Law before proposing and supporting his own version).
3. A good statement, technically, is that bad or less desirable currency tends to
drive out (or circulate instead of) good or more desirable currency if both exchange for
the same price (e.g., because of legal tender laws). Id. at 10. As we shall see, however,

the legitimacy of some accreditation rules and why accreditation itself is
an important form of public protection.
This article will first examine the traditional Gresham's Law regarding
currency and then its broader application to instances in which the
nominal and intrinsic values of something are separated. It will then
look at the licensing of attorneys and how Gresham's Law may justify
both the general accreditation of legal education and specific accreditation
Standards. Viewed from this perspective it is the interests of the public,
and not the more parochial interests of law schools, that deserve primary
consideration in accreditation related to licensure. The article will conclude
with a consideration of a coming debate about the appropriate place of
scholarly research as a requirement of accreditation.
II. GRESHAM'S LAW

Thomas Gresham, a merchant and ambassador, was writing his letter
to the Queen to urge her to avoid further debasing the Pound and to
restore the legitimacy of the coinage.4 Her predecessors had financed
wars, debts and entanglements by producing various forms of coins that
contained such limited precious metal that they were a small fraction of
the face value of the coins.5 The result was the flight of gold from England
and various internal economic problems.6 In the opening section of the
letter Gresham noted these consequences of the debasement of the
currency and the unfortunate consequence of trying to circulate such
currency. 7 The principle he enunciated is commonly stated as "good
money drives bad money out of circulation," but this is, technically, a
somewhat incomplete, or even incorrect, statement of the principle.8
It was not until 1858 that economist H.D. Macleod described the
principle as "Gresham's Law," carelessly phrasing it as the fact that
good and bad money "cannot circulate together."9 In fact, Gresham was
not the first to have understood such a principle. Robert Mundell traces
the origin more than twenty centuries before Gresham to Theognis in the
late sixth century BC.10
a broader form of Gresham's Law can operate when the intrinsic and nominal values of
something can be separated. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
4. See Frank Whitson Fetter, Some Neglected Aspects of Gresham's Law, 46 Q.J.
ECON. 480 (1932).
5. See H. Buckley, Sir Thomas Gresham and the Foreign Exchange, 34 ECON. J.
589 (1924) (discussing the monetary circumstances of Gresham's era).
6. Id.
7. Fetter, supra note 4, at 482.
8. Mundell, supra note 2, at 8-10.
9. Id. at 3 (quoting H.D. Macleod without specific attribution).
10. Id. at4.

[Vol. 17: 171, 2008]

Gresham'sLaw
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

There are any number of statements, good and bad, claiming to capture
Gresham's Law."' The most common statement, that "bad money drives
good out of circulation," is bad (incomplete) and has mostly driven out
the more complete or accurate statements. 1 2 Robert Mundell notes that
without more qualification, in fact, good money drives out bad money
because nobody will take bad money and it will cease to circulate. 3 For
bad money to drive out good, the additional condition must be added
that both forms of money are legal tender and both must, therefore, be
accepted in payment of debts.' 4 In such circumstances the debtor will
choose to pay his debt using the debased (or bad) money and keeping for
himself the good.' 5
Mundell believes a correct expression of Gresham's Law is that,
"cheap money drives out dear, if they exchange for the same price."16
Cheap and dear money would exchange for the same price, ordinarily,
only if there were a legal requirement that they do so, as is the case with
a "legal tender" law.' 7
Gresham's Law has been applied to any number of non-monetary
situations. 18 The uses of Gresham's Law in this manner are by way of
analogy or metaphor. For example, the claim has been made that bad
11.
See supra note 8.
12.
The very simplicity of "bad money drives out good money" may account for
its success. It neglects to state several of the conditions necessary for the law to operate,
including that legal tender laws or the like separate the nominal and intrinsic values. See
Buckley, supra note 5.
13.
Mundell, supra note 2, at 8.
14. Id. at 6-8. See also George Selgin, Salvaging Gresham's Law: The Good, the
Bad, and the Illegal,28 J.MONEY CREDIT BANK 637, 643 (1996).
15.
See Mundell, supra note 2, at 7 (stating a debtor's "law of economy" as "of
two types of payment, pay with that which involves the least sacrifice").
16. Id. at 9. This generally supposes that there is sufficient cheap money in
circulation to meet the immediate needs of the economy so that the "dear money" is not
needed. Id.
17. Id. at 8-9.
18. The judiciary has noted Gresham's Law: a Lexis search identified thirty-eight
federal court opinions (including four U.S. Supreme Court decisions) and ten state court
opinions citing Gresham's Law. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820,
833 (1976) (applying Gresham's Law in holding that the 1964 Civil Rights Act must
supply a federal employee's exclusive remedy for job-related racial discrimination
because if other judicial remedies were available, no employee would first seek
administrative relief as the Act requires); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017,
1019-20 (5th Cir. 1987) (suggesting the First Amendment's free speech guarantee
"rel[ies] on a reverse Gresham's law, trusting to good ideas to drive out bad ones and
forbidding governmental intervention into the free market of ideas.").

teaching drives good teaching out of the law school. 9 Such applications
are not literal statements of the classical Gresham's Law, but rather a
general recognition that ironically and sadly there are conditions under
which the good loses out to the less adequate.
The more generalized form of Gresham's Law may arise where
something has "intrinsic" and "nominal" values that are unequal.2" This
is at the core of the original observation of Gresham. That is, coins had
an intrinsic value based on the metal of which they were made. They
also had a nominal value based on the legal tender established by the
monarch.2 The distinction between the nominal and intrinsic values
causes people to try to obtain the benefits of the nominal value while
preserving for themselves much of the intrinsic value (or avoiding the
intrinsic costs).22
At the heart of Gresham's Law is the observation that when people
can pay with something of greater or lesser value, they will do so with
the lesser.23 In a similar way, "charters" (e.g., licenses and education
degrees) may also create the dynamics of Gresham's Law. These charters
are commonly "paid for" by money, time and efforts.24 There are sometimes
both nominal and intrinsic values and costs of these charters, with the
nominal value being the representation of the intrinsic benefit. For
example, college degrees are the nominal statement for the many
intrinsic benefits provided by education. Or, a driver's license is the
nominal statement for some assurance of decent driving ability (the
intrinsic value).
It is the possible separation of the nominal and intrinsic values of
these charters that raises the specter of Gresham's Law. Some people
will seek the nominal value of the charter without paying for the full
intrinsic value (or cost) because it will be less costly in terms of time and
19.
Roger C. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 321, 330-31 (1982).
20. This separation of nominal and intrinsic value has not been a part of the routine
economic discussion of Gresham's Law, but it is the underlying principle that causes the
ironic result of the market "rewarding" something of lesser value.
21.
The necessity of something like "legal tender" laws to make Gresham's Law
operate becomes obvious. Those laws create the nominal value as distinguished from
intrinsic value. See Fetter, supra note 4.
22.
See Mundell, supra note 2, at 7 ("motivated by the law of economy,"
individuals will "pay with that which involves the least sacrifice"). See also Selgin,
supra note 14, at 641 (using game theory to explain how Gresham's Law operates
through rational actors' utility decisions).
23. Mundell, supra note 2, at 7.
24. A legitimate law degree, for example, requires the payment of tuition plus
years of study and successfully passing examinations to prove that the student has
acquired the necessary knowledge and skills.
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effort. If that charter (nominal benefit) is accepted for some purposes in
some markets, cheap providers (those giving the charter without ensuring
the full intrinsic value) may put pressure on quality providers (who
furnish the intrinsic value as well as the charter).
Suppose, for example, that a person may receive a state driver's
license in one of two ways: by sending $50 to the Department of Motor
Vehicles, or by going to the DMV, taking written and driving tests and
paying $50. Many people will be inclined to do the former because they
want to have the license without paying the "cost" of mastering the rules
and good driving technique, and taking the test to prove their skills.
That is, they may obtain the nominal value of a license without "paying"
the intrinsic cost of the learning and testing. This is, of course, unfortunate
for the general public because it would probably result in more unprepared
drivers on the streets. It would presumably also not be in the interest of
the individual drivers not just because they would be facing more
unprepared drivers on the road, but because they themselves would be
less well prepared for driving than if they had undertaken the more
rigorous program.
A state in which both a "pay only drivers license" and the "pay plus
testing drivers license" were available would probably see the "pay
only" system attract many more customers. Moreover, it would likely
draw so many customers away from the better system that it would
threaten the existence of the "pay plus testing drivers license" or put
pressure on it not to adopt especially tough standards. Here the nominal
value is the same to potential drivers whether they go to the trouble of
learning good driving technique or not.2 5
Economists have noted that Gresham's Law will operate even if there
is a market somewhere that recognizes the true intrinsic value as being
higher than the nominal value of the money. Indeed, some market, other
than the one that uses the nominal value, must exist for there to be an
intrinsic value. That is, technically, there must be two kinds of money
"which are of equivalent value for some purposes and of different value
for others., 2 6 The example typically given is of two coins, one of
debased value, that have the same nominal value within a country

25.
They would, of course, have other incentives apart from the licensing process
to learn to be good drivers. The fear of liability or personal injury, for example, would
be incentives to learn to drive reasonably well. The point here, however, is that they can
obtain the nominal value of a license without paying the intrinsic value cost.
26. Mundell, supra note 2, at 9.

because of exchange laws. 27 For another purpose, however, they have
different value, notably they may be melted down for bullion or transferred
28
out of the country for a better exchange based on their intrinsic value.
In a similar way, the more generalized form of Gresham's Law will
operate when the nominal value (say, of the license) is not the same for
all purposes. Even if, for example, some employers or insurance companies
preferred the "pay plus testing" license, it is likely that competition from
the "pay only" system would put pressure' on the "pay plus testing" system.
That pressure might result, for example, in the "pay plus testing" system
becoming a special niche or providing very low testing standards to
encourage more drivers to use their system.
In short, when the nominal value and intrinsic value of something can
be separated, the risk exists that efforts to obtain the benefits of the
nominal value without having to pay the full price for the intrinsic value
will occur. The result often is not only to make the easy (bad) approach
to obtaining the nominal value attractive, but the resulting competition
may cheapen the value to society. This was the case with the "pay only"
license where society received less protection from bad drivers.

III. THE LICENSING OF ATTORNEYS
A society might hypothetically let the free market completely control
the practice of law. It could allow anyone to claim to be an attorney,
give legal advice, draft documents and appear before tribunals. That is
generally not the approach for several reasons, beyond the historical
guild reasons.29 Attorneys are officers of the court3" and it is understandable
that the judicial system would want to have considerable influence over
the selection of its officers. The selection of attorneys to represent someone
is, therefore, not a purely private matter.
It would be difficult, and perhaps inefficient, for consumers to be able
to obtain solid information about the basic competence and honesty of
attorneys they are considering. All Sony 42-inch plasma TVs may be
essentially the same, but it would be hard to say the same thing about
most groups of attorneys. In theory, at least, the public might depend
upon the school graduation to assure basic quality, and there might be
private testing of attorneys, but beyond that, obtaining good information

27.
Id. at 9-10.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Public efficiency and the costs to others of inadequate counsel are considered
in notes 31-32 infra and accompanying text.
30.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).
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about the basic competence of individual attorneys would be challenging
for many members of the public.3 1
Attorneys also have an impact on others beyond those engaging them.
Opposing parties, for example, may pay costs of delay and unnecessary
fees when the other party is represented by incompetent or unethical
counsel. In this manner, therefore, one party can, in effect, impose on
others the costs of the party having selected incompetent or inadequate
attorneys.
The legitimacy of the licensing of attorneys depends primarily on
protecting the public from incompetent and inadequately trained attorneys
and from dishonest people who would use the status of attorney to cheat
and harm others.32 The test of the licensing system, therefore, ultimately
relies on whether on balance it is enhancing or harming the interests of
the public. The licensing process inevitably reduces the number of people
who can practice as attorneys, so the legitimacy of the process must
depend on an improvement in the quality and the elimination of the
inadequately trained or dishonest attorney.
The current licensing of attorneys in the United States generally
consists of three parts:33
1.
2.

An education requirement. Most attorneys must have completed
an undergraduate degree (or at least three years of undergraduate
work) and have graduated from an accredited law school.
A test. Almost all states require the successful completion of a
test of basic legal skills and knowledge.

In this way, of course, major law firms and similar employers would be in a
31.
very different position than average members of the public. The sophisticated users of
legal services represent a market with substantially different information about practitioners.
For many average citizens, the license represents the qualification they will rely on to
seek legal advice. The degree to which more, comprehensive and reliable information
and reviews will become available to the public as a result of the internet remains to be
seen.
32.
STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 5-11 (3d ed. 1992). See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 1-2 (1983) (noting that "the public should be protected from those who are not
qualified to be lawyers by reason of a deficiency in education or moral"); ASS'N OF AM.
LAW SCHS., BAR EXAMINATION STUDY PROJECT 3 (1976) (licensing is to prevent harm
by incompetent practitioners).
33. See generally NAT'L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS AND A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS (2007) [hereinafter, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE]; Nat'l Conf. of Bar Examiners,
2005 Statistics, THE BAR EXAMINER, May 2006, at 23 [hereinafter, Statistics].

3.

Fitness. Applicants must demonstrate good character and fitness
for the practice of law.

The first two of these are intended to ensure basic competence in legal
skills and knowledge of the law. 34 The third is intended to
protect the
35
characters.
unscrupulous
other
and
cheats
liars,
from
public
For many years the American Bar Association has urged that states
require both graduation from an ABA approved law school and passing
a bar examination as the basis for licensure.36 These are in some ways
redundant. After all, a solid legal education will have repeated testing of
the knowledge and competence of law students. Or, if a bar examination
is really good, it should be able to test adequately whether someone is
prepared to practice law whether or not the person has attended law
school.
The redundancy in part reflects the sense that neither law school
graduation nor passing a bar exam provides the necessary assurance of
competence. 37 In truth, the bar exam tests a small part of the skills and
values that the profession and public expect will be imparted in law
school. 3' At best, for example, it only modestly tests legal research,
problem solving skills or oral advocacy. 39 It is a single exam with all the
34.
A.B.A. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) (the profession
should "assure the public and the courts that its members are competent").

35.
Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: Understandingthe "Good Moral
Character"Examinationfor BarApplicants, 40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007). See Michael K.
McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character Requirement for Bar
Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67 (1984) (states universally require good moral
character for licensing).
36. See A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS iv (2006)

[hereinafter STANDARDS]
(The Council and the ABA believe that every candidate for admission to the bar
should have graduated from a law school approved by the ABA, that graduation from
a law school alone should not confer the right of admission to the bar, and that every

candidate for admission should be examined by public authority to determine fitness
for admission).
37.

Id.

38.

STANDARDS, supra note 36, at 126. The ABA's standards for legal education

explain that: "Bar examinations ... encourage law graduates to study subjects not taken
in law school[,] ...to view the separate subject courses ... as a related whole[, and to]
be examined by persons other than those who taught them, a valuable experience in

preparation for appearing before a completely strange judge." Id.
39. Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to
Pass Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269 (2007); Katharine Rosenberry, Organizational
Barriersto Creativity in Law Schools and the Legal Profession,41 CAL. W. L. REV. 423
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risks of single high-stakes tests.40 At the same time, most states are not
entirely comfortable with law schools defining by themselves who has
and has not become sufficiently competent to practice law.4 1 In some
ways the bar exam is meant to be a check on law schools and what they
are demanding of graduates.42
It is possible to imagine an examination system without an education
requirement. In some ways California has a hint of such as system.
California permits graduates from ABA accredited law schools to sit for

(2005); Lorenzo A. Trujillo, Law School: The RelationshipBetween Law School and the
Bar Exam: A Look at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 69 (2007).
40. There are many criticisms of the bar examination process, e.g., Andrea A.
Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam Should Change, 81 NEB. L.
REv. 363 (2002); Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission
to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1696 (2002); Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do
We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justificationsfor the Bar
Examination and ProposedAlternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1191 (1995). For an
interesting and controversial suggestion for bar passage efforts see Christian C. Day,
Law Schools Can Solve the "BarPass Problem"--"Do the Work!," 40 CAL. W. L. REV.
321 (2004).
41.
Among the few exceptions, Wisconsin has a diploma privilege for the
University of Wisconsin and Marquette Law schools and does not require a bar
examination for graduates of those schools. Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 40.03. Specifically, this
rule states:
Legal competence requirement: Diploma privilege. An applicant who has been
awarded a first professional degree in law from a law school in this state that is
fully, not provisionally, approved by the American Bar Association shall satisfy
the legal competence requirement by presenting to the clerk certification of the
board showing:
(1)
Satisfactory completion of legal studies leading to the first
professional degree in law. The law school shall certify to the board
satisfactory completion of not less than 84 semester credits earned by
the applicant for purposes of the degree awarded.
(2)
Satisfactory completion of study in mandatory and elective subject
matter areas....
Id.
New Hampshire is also experimenting with eliminating the bar examination for some
students. Leigh Jones, Skipping over the Bar: New HampshireProgramAllows Students
to PracticeBefore Passing the Dreaded Exam, AMERICAN LAWYER, STUDENT EDITION,
June 2006, available at http://www.americanlawyerse.com/0806/newhampshire.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
42. STANDARDS, supra note 36, at 126 (bar exam "should determine that the
content of the applicant's education is such that upon admission he will be able to
adequately serve the public").

the bar examination.43 It also permits students from California accredited
law schools to take the bar exam. 4 Even graduates of law schools that
are not California accredited, including correspondence schools and
online schools, may take the California bar examination if they pass the
"Baby Bar" after the first year of law school.45 It is also possible to read
for the law in California.4 6
The result of this system is to put enormous pressure on the bar exam.
The consequence is that in 2005 only 46 percent of all of the test takers
in California passed the bar examination. 47 Even among ABA schools
the overall bar passage rate was only 54 percent.48 It was 16 percent for
non-ABA schools. 49 The first-time taker rate was somewhat higher, with a
total first-time taker rate of 62 percent.5 0 The state thus puts enormous
reliance on a single exam that has very real limits. The California bar
examination is a standard deviation more difficult (based on MBE
scores) than its easiest sibling, South Carolina."'
The bar admissions system in California raises the interesting question
of whether California accredited schools or unaccredited schools, whose
graduates can take the bar examination, put Gresham's Law-like pressure

43. STATE BAR OF CAL., RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CAL.
R. VII, § 2(a) (2006) [hereinafter STATE BAR REG.].
44. Id. at R. VII, § 2(b)(1). California conducts its own accreditation system with
standards that appear to be noticeably less rigorous than the ABA. Compare STATE BAR
OF CAL., RULES REGULATING ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS IN CALIFORNIA R. 2
[hereinafter ACCREDITATION IN CALIFORNIA] (listing twelve very generalized accreditation

standards, such as "a sound educational program"), with STANDARDS, supra note 36, at
11-48 (listing over forty specific Standards and guidance for interpretation, such as
Standard 302(a), which requires that "each student receive substantial instruction" in
legal writing, analysis, reasoning, research, and problem-solving as well as substantive
law and oral communication). For the official list of law schools in California, see
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-generic.jsp?cid= 10115&id=5128# cal (last visited
Mar. 12, 2007).
45.
STATE BAR REG., supra note 43, at R. VII, §§ 2,4,6; R. VIII, § 1(a).
46. Id. at R. VII, § 3.
47. NAT'L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, 2005 STATISTICS 1 (2005), http://www.
ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/BarAdmissions/2005stats.pdf

(last visited Mar.

12, 2007).
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 5.
51.
Id. The National Conference of Bar Examiners indicates that a standard
deviation on the Multistate Bar Examination is approximately 15 points. The difference
between South Carolina and California is slightly more than 15 points. See COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE and Statistics, supra note 33 (presenting data on MBE performance nationally);
personal correspondence with NCBE (May 19, 2007; May 21, 2007).

Gresham's Law
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on the accredited schools to reduce quality. 2 There may, in fact, be
such pressure, but it is not significant. Because the diplomas, for bar
examination purposes, are equivalent for qualifying for the bar exam,
Gresham's law would seem to suggest that the low quality in the schools
might tend to drive out what is expected to be the higher quality education
at ABA schools. Yet, for the most part this does not appear to be
happening. 3 There may be several reasons. For one thing the diplomas
of some of these schools are not really equivalent even for the examination
purposes. The unaccredited school students must take the "Baby Bar"54
after the first year, which is a significant bar admissions difference
between the two types of schools.
Among California accredited law schools, compared with ABA schools,
there are substantial admissions differences because very few states outside
of California will accept California accredited schools as meeting the
educational requirement for admission to practice in those states.55 If,
therefore, a student in his or her career will ever want to practice in
52. Applicants to law school would likely see on-line law school as requiring less
of a commitment of time and energy, at a minimum because it does not require that they
be present physically or that their plans be disrupted with a rigorous class attendance
schedule. Robert E. Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School
Revolutionize TraditionalLaw School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841 (2000);
Andrew S. Rosen, Concord University School of Law's On-line Law Degree Program,
15 ST. JOHN'S J.LEGAL COMMENT. 311 (2001).

53. Applications have declined in recent years to ABA approved law schools, but
there is no evidence that this is related to applicants being drawn to unaccredited schools.
Rather, it appears to be related to a cyclical reduction in the number LSAT test-takers.
The LSAT test administration data are reported at http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=
lsac/tests-administered.asp (last visited May 19, 2007). See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL &
A.B.A., A.B.A./LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO A.B.A.-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 64-72
(2007); LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & A.B.A., A.B.A./LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO
A.B.A.-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 64-72 (2006); LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL &
A.B.A., A.B.A./LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO A.B.A.-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 64-73
(2005).
STATE BAR REG., supra note 43, at R. VIII, § l(a). The First Year Law
54.
Students' Examination, commonly known as the "Baby Bar," is an examination required
of students who wish ultimately to take the California Bar examination and are studying
at unaccredited law schools in California. Id. It is given after the first year of law
school. Id. It covers the basic first-year subjects. COMM. OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF CAL., DESCRIPTION AND GRADING OF THE FIRST YEAR LAW STUDENTS'
In part it protects weak
EXAMINATION 1, http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/40sfD3010.pdf.

students by preventing schools from exploiting them by continuing them in law school
after the first year of classes. It may also protect the public by providing an additional
barrier to licensing those with weak legal skills.
55. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 33.

another state, the absence of ABA accreditation will probably preclude
that. There is generally a very substantial reputational difference between
most of the California accredited schools and most of the ABA schools.
In addition, California accreditation does not always qualify law schools
to seek, or students to obtain, certain scholarship, loan or other
benefits." Finally, the California bar examination is so difficult and the
pass rate for many of the California accredited and unaccredited law
schools is so low, that the bar examination itself probably operates to
interfere with the operation of Gresham's Law.
This situation could, of course, change. If other states routinely accept
California accreditation for admission to their bar, for example, it is
possible that Gresham's law would operate to put pressure on some
ABA schools to lower the quality of their programs.
The operation of a form of Gresham's Law can be seen in a very
different way in the reaction of law schools to U.S. News rankings.57
Here the nominal benefits of receiving a good ranking are essentially
independent of the true intrinsic value of a law school and its programs.5"
56. Organizations that sponsor scholarships, writing contests or student aid, for
example, commonly specify that the organization must be an ABA approved law school.
The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar and its Accreditation
Committee are the bodies recognized by the U.S. Department of Education to accredit
law schools. STANDARDS, supra note 36, at iv. If an institution does not have ABA
accreditation, it would need some other DOE recognized accreditation to obtain federal
student loan funds. The Department of Education summarizes this requirement for
students, "The U.S. Department of Education requires that schools that participate in our
federal student aid programs be accredited. You also could find that your state education
agency's aid programs won't pay for your attendance at unaccredited schools." U.S.
Dept. of Educ., http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/consider.
jsp?tab=choosing (last visited May 19, 2007).
57.
U.S. News & World Report publishes annual rankings of ABA accredited law
schools based on a weighted average of twelve factors. See Robert J. Morse et al., How
We Rank, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 2006, at 59. These include peer and
lawyer/judge assessment scores, acceptance rates, bar passage rates, expenditures per
student, and other factors. Id.
58.
Most of the law school deans in the country have signed a letter to law school
applicants criticizing the use of U.S. News.
The absence of any consideration of [many] factors, combined with the arbitrary
weighting of numerical factors, makes ranking systems an unreliable guide to the
differences among law schools that should be important to you ....
A ranking
system that exemplifies the shortcomings of all "by the numbers" schemes is the
one produced annually by U.S. News & World Report. While ignoring [important
variables] . . . the U.S. News rankings purport to be derived from mathematical
formulae based on data common to all law schools. The 'weights' attached to the
variables are arbitrary and reflect only the view of the magazine's editors.
Law School Admission Council, http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/deans-speakout-rankings.asp.
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In a sense, using Mundell's formulation,59 it would not be surprising to
see bad practice and information tending to drive out or put pressure on
good academic or information practices in the U.S. News process. U.S.
News will accept good academic practice and bad academic practice
(e.g., admissions practices) as the same ("they exchange for the same
price").6" It will even often accept good information and bad information as
the same. 6' But, the bad practice may result in a higher rating (nominal
value).6 2
Because the nominal value or benefit of a good rating is separated
from the true or intrinsic value of a law school program, and U.S. News
accepts good and bad practices as the same, we could expect that the U.S.
News process would tend to drive out good practice and reward bad. In
fact, educators and others complain that is exactly what happens.6 3
Complaints are common, for example, that admissions decisions at a
number of law schools are influenced by the desire to make the law
school look slightly better than it is based on LSAT scores and the like.64
The New York Times reported that several law schools engaged in
questionable practices to make themselves look better. 65 Northwestern
59.
Mundell, supra note 2, at 10 ("cheap money drives out dear, if they exchange
for the same price").
60. Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S.
News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW &
Soc'v REV. 105, 110 (2006). The authors repeat two criticisms of the rankings: "that
they are methodologically inaccurate signals of ... law school quality," and that the
ranking process itself distorts "the distribution of quality among law schools ... [thus]
reshap[ing] the[ir] reputational terrain." Id.
61.
It has been reported for some years that some law schools "fudge" the data, or
outright lie about it. See infra note 65 and accompanying text regarding the University
of Illinois, Northwestern and Indiana University. Furthermore, if a school does not
provide some data, the magazine may simply estimate (make up) the data. It routinely
does so, for example, for placement rates at graduation. The good (true) and the bad
(made up or false) data appear the same in the magazine.
62. If a law school increases its range of LSAT scores by either fudging or
changing its admissions practices to look better in U.S. News, it will presumably go up in
the rankings. See Pamela Edwards, The LSA T, U.S. News & World Report, and Minority
Admissions: The Shell Game: Who Is Responsiblefor the Overuse of the LSA T in Law
School Admissions?, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 153 (2006).
63.
See Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 60, at 109-10 (describing how rankings
lead administrators to emphasize "'the numbers' rather than educational quality").
Deans complain, from time to time, that their schools are being penalized unfairly for
honest reporting and that they are under pressure to similarly fudge their data.
64. Id. at 110 (listing "strategies schools have adopted to game the rankings").
65.
Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 4A, at 18.

and Indiana University law schools, for example, briefly hired some of
their own graduates for short internships to make its employment statistics
look better and the University of Illinois incorrectly attributed the difference
between the Lexis educational rate and commercial rate as a law school
expenditure and a contribution to the law school.6 6
Deans sometimes say in private that they feel they must fudge figures
or engage in other inappropriate academic behavior because other law
schools are doing so and will get ahead of them. It is a sad commentary
that the ABA accreditation Standards had to be changed to indicate that
law schools were required to provide honest and correct data regardless
of where the information was published.6 7
The primary focus of Gresham's Law in this article, however, is on
accreditation. The existence of an education requirement means that
there must be some definition of an acceptable legal education. Gresham's
Law helps to explain why.
IV. GRESHAM'S LAW AND ACCREDITATION
The legal education requirement to sit for the bar exam is defined as
requiring a specific degree. 68 The nominal value is a diploma from law
school. The intrinsic value of the degree, of course, is the education,
skills and values, and the close evaluation of candidates implied by the
degree itself. In qualifying for the bar examination, therefore, it is possible
to separate the nominal value of the degree from the intrinsic value of
the education.
Without some definition of the education requirement, any matchbook
diploma would do. Not only would there be individuals sitting for the
bar exam without the benefit of legal education, but the existence of this
option would put pressure on legitimate legal education to become
easier, shorter and weaker. Thus, the bad diplomas would tend to put
pressure on, but probably not drive out, the good diplomas. Because a
bar exam would still await anyone wishing to be licensed, the matchbook
66.

Id.

STANDARDS, supra note 36, at Standard 509 ("A law school shall publish basic
consumer information ... [which] shall be published in a fair and accurate manner.").
Interpretation 509-3 provides:
Standard 509 requires a law school fairly and accurately to report basic consumer
information whenever and wherever that information is reported or published. A
law school's participation in the Council-designated publication referred to in
Interpretation 509-2 and its provision of fair and accurate information for that
book does not excuse a school from the obligation to report fairly and accurately
all basic consumer information published in other places or for other purposes.
Id. at 38.
68. STATE BAR REG., supra note 43, at R. VII, § 2(a).
67.

[Vol. 17: 171, 2008]

Gresham's Law
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

degrees might not be very attractive, but institutions focused solely on
getting their students through the bar examination might be sufficiently
attractive to put pressure on other law schools to become more like
diploma mills with a strong focus on the bar examination.
This is not to say that sitting for the bar exam is not the only value of
or market for a law degree.6 9 Presumably law firms, especially larger
firms, would in any event distinguish among law students and law
schools based on quality.7" This is, of course, fully consistent with the
technical operation of Gresham's Law where, we noted earlier, economists
have recognized that it operates only if there is a market somewhere that
recognizes the true intrinsic value as being higher than the nominal value
of the money.7 ' In the case of law schools, Gresham's Law predicts that
there is a potential for a competition downward to see how little can be
required for the degree as it relates to qualifying applicants to sit for the
bar (as opposed to other values of the degree). Other "markets" for
holders of the JD (e.g., sophisticated law firms) certainly impact much of
legal education, 2but do not necessarily eliminate all of the effects of
7
Gresham's Law.
Accreditation ensures sham degrees cannot satisfy the bar examination's
education requirement. ABA accreditation has the advantage of providing a
uniform, national standard by which legal education can be defined and
reviewed. It avoids not only the inefficiency of each state having to do it
itself, but the political pressures and problems that would inevitably
arise in many states if this accreditation were purely local.7 3
69. The operation of Gresham's Law is essentially related to the fact that a law
degree, at least from an ABA-accredited school, qualifies the holder of the degree to sit
for the bar examination, regardless of the quality of the education underlying the degree.
See supra text following note 28.
70.
The mechanisms by which law firms take account of the quality of those they
interview and hire are the subject of their own problems, which, fortunately, are beyond
the scope of this article.
71.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
72.
Many of the other consumers of JD degrees do not rely on the basic diploma
from law schools, as bar examiners do, in making decisions regarding law school
graduates. Perhaps many individual consumers may often be unaware of the educational
qualifications of attorneys, but law firms, businesses and the like do not view all law
degrees as being equal. As noted above, this market (other than qualification to sit for
the bar examination) is consistent with Gresham's Law. Id. The discussion of internships
demonstrates that Gresham's Law can work even hidden within legal education. See
infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
73.
Some states, notably California, do have state accreditation as an alternative to
ABA accreditation. See, e.g., ACCREDITATION INCALIFORNIA, supra note 44; COMPREHENSIVE

Law schools commonly put strong emphasis on the interests of their
students.74 They also appropriately focus on the interests of their faculty
and staff, and the institutional interests of the law school and the
university.7 5 This emphasis on the education and graduation of students
often includes a desire for the admission of its graduates to the profession
with as little difficulty as possible, which accounts for the periodic
strained relations between law schools and bar admitting authorities.76
These emphases of law schools are extremely important and certainly
appropriate. Schools should see their students as their reason for existing
and as their primary constituents. Law schools are serving the public by
providing a sound legal education to their students, but the public
interest generally is not specifically given great consideration in law
school decisions.77
Law schools and universities are not the only ones that emphasize
protection of students. The U.S. Department of Education, for example,
also focuses on protecting students and government funds used to make
student loans.78 It requires that essential information be available to

supra note 33. State accredited law schools by and large are weaker and have
lower bar passage rates than do nationally accredited schools.
74.
Law schools generally see students as their immediate clients or customers. It
is common in law schools to hear discussion of the students' interests, but less common
to have the public's interests in quality legal care discussed. As a result, law schools are
often somewhat more sympathetic to, or easier on, the students than the bar examiners or
their law firms will be. See generally Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law Firms and Soft Law
Schools, 83 N.C.L. Rev. 667 (2005) ("American law practice, like American business,
has become Harder in recent years. At the same time, American law schools have
become Softer. The result is that law schools are doing a poor job of preparing students
for practice"). Id. at 667.
75.
In my experience, the public interest in its graduates is not a major factor as
universities make decisions regarding their law schools. Faculty and staff understandably put
institutional and even personal interests ahead of any concerns about the public interest.
The external discipline of ABA accreditation, therefore, is an opportunity to inject public
interest concerns into the decision making of law schools and their universities.
76. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
77.
In my experience, formal and informal discussions among law faculty
concerning bar results and the bar exam are primarily focused on the institutional
interests (notably reputation) and students' interest (costs, jobs and career delay). Most
of the discussion of the bar examination in articles published by law faculty focus on
these same questions or the general inadequacy of the exam in testing students. See
supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. Criticisms of the bar exam as being
inadequate truly to test law practice skills do concern the public interest, but are more
often actually a concern about the failure rate on the bar exam. Id.
78. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.1-602.50 (2007).
GUIDE,
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students,79 that there
be student support services,8 ° and that students receive
81
debt counseling.
Many accrediting bodies also put considerable emphasis on student
and institutional interests, as well as general educational quality.8"
Regional and other general accrediting agencies, for example, commonly
see student protection as a basic role of their accreditation. 83 This is
appropriate
given the obligations to their constituents and their reason
84
for being.
Accreditation associated closely with licensing is different. Licensing
exists to protect the public interest.85 The education requirement of
licensing provides the public with well-educated professionals. Licenserelated accreditation is intended to ensure that the education requirement
79. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(1)(vii) (2007) (a DOE recognized accrediting
agency must have standards related to "[rjecruiting and admissions practices, academic
calendars, catalogs, publications, grading, and advertising"). The regulations also require that
accrediting agencies consider institutions' compliance with standards related "to student
achievement in relation to the institution's mission, including, as appropriate, consideration of
course completion, State licensing examination, and job placement rates." Id. at (i).
80. Id. at (vi).
81.
Id. at (x)
(an accrediting agency's standards must address an institution's "[r]ecord of
compliance with ... [its] program responsibilities under Title IV of the Act, based
on the most recent student loan default rate data[,] ... the results of financial or
compliance audits, program reviews, and any other information that the Secretary
may provide to the agency").
82. JUDIrrH S. EATON, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. ACCREDITATION 2 (Council for Higher
Educ. Accreditation 2006).
83. Id. The mission statement of a major collective of accrediting agencies, the
Council for Higher Education Accreditation, for example, emphasizes this: "The Council for
Higher Education Accreditation will serve students and their families, colleges and
universities, sponsoring bodies, governments, and employers by promoting academic
quality through formal recognition of higher education accrediting bodies and will
coordinate and work to advance self-regulation through accreditation." Id. at 2.
84. Accrediting bodies not closely related to licensing may appropriately take into
account the interests and missions of its members. In this sense it can have a narrower or
more specialized set of interests it is seeking to protect. The Association of American
Law Schools, for example, is an organization of law school members and its membership
review process (accreditation) can appropriately take into account the interests of law
schools, law professors and law students in its member schools. See infra notes 107-08
and accompanying text. The Department of Education is increasingly taking the view,
over the objection of many accrediting agencies, that recognized agencies should be
required to push accredited schools to measure the "outcomes" of their educational
programs. Paul Basken, Education Departmentto Pushfor Major Changes in Accreditation,
53 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 11, 2007, at A36.
85. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.

of licensing, in fact, produces well-educated professionals.86 To fulfill
this function, the primary focus of license-related accreditation agencies
must be on accrediting only those programs that produce reasonably
well-qualified professionals.
These agencies should also avoid applying requirements unnecessary
to this function. Such requirements may interfere with the agencies' primary
mission of ensuring reasonable quality, prevent legitimate competition
among education providers and unnecessarily drive up the costs of
professional education.8 7
For legal education, if the legitimacy of the licensing of attorneys
depends on protecting the public (including the courts), the main focus
of license-related education standards must be the protection of the
public by ensuring that law students are reasonably well trained and
examined as part of the education process.88
Using the authority of the licensing process (certifying the educational
program is sufficient for licensing purposes) to promote goals other than
the public interest carries risks. It should be done with care for several
reasons. The "mission creep" to other goals may divert critical attention
and resources of the accrediting agency away from ensuring reasonably
high quality professional preparation.89 Even worse, it raises the possibility
of a conflict of interest between the obligations to the public and
obligations to others (faculty, institutions or students). 90
86. See supra notes 32-36.
87. There are periodic claims that accreditation, and ABA accreditation of law
schools in particular, violates antitrust concepts. See Marina Lao, DiscreditingAccreditation?:
Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1035 (2001). The ABA signed a
consent decree limiting the ability of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar to, among other things, take into account faculty salaries in the law school
accreditation process. Id.
88. The same point, of course, applies to other professional accrediting bodies that
are closely tied to licensure in their professions. For example, the American Medical
Association and Association of American Medical Colleges joint Liaison Committee on
Medical Education carries many of the same responsibilities as the ABA in ensuring that
it operates in the best interest of the public. See LIAISON COMM. ON MEDICAL EDUC.,
FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF A MEDICAL SCHOOL: STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION
OF MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS LEADING TO THE M.D. DEGREE, PART 2: STANDARDS

AND EXPLANATORY ANNOTATIONS (2007), http://www.lcme.org/functions2007jun.pdf.

89. "Mission creep" in accreditation may result from the influence of special
interests who seek to use the authority of accreditation to promote accreditation requirements
more closely tied to those special interests than to the public interest. Mission creep may
also result when a license-related accrediting agency fails to expressly tie its accrediting
policies to the public interest. See Steven Smith, The Best System of Accreditation in
America, 38 SYLLABUS 1 (2006).

90. If ABA accreditation were to focus too clearly on student interests, for
example, it might begin to minimize its public interest obligation to ensure full and
rigorous legal education. At some point such a student emphasis could harm the public
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The American Bar Association, particularly its Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar, has for many years promoted
itself as an important part of the licensing process.9 It has been very
successful.92 A testament to its credibility over the years is the fact that
every state will accept graduation from an ABA-approved law school as
meeting the graduation requirements for sitting for the bar.93 In most
states it is the only certification that will meet that requirement. 94 This
success in tying its accreditation to licensing places an especially strong
obligation on the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar to operate the accreditation system in the interest of the public.
The ABA accreditation process has intentionally become a critical part
of a system
that gains its legitimacy from the protection of the public
95
interest.
When undertaken with care, the protection of students and others may
be consistent with the obligations to the public in ABA or other licenserelated education. The obligation to provide some protection to students,
for example, arises from the ABA's recognition by the Department of
Education.96 Students are members of the public so they deserve that
"public protection" as does the rest of society, but that relates to their
role as clients or beneficiaries of the legal system generally. Licensing
is not intended to provide special benefits to those preparing for the
by being overly concerned about immediate student interests. Consider the situation in
which a law school (in a state requiring ABA approval to sit for the bar exam) applies for
accreditation, but its quality of instruction does not justify accreditation. The interest of
students of that school, as they graduate, is to receive accreditation for the school so they
can be admitted to the bar. That student interest would conflict with the public interest
in having well-educated lawyers. If the ABA accreditation process were so concerned
about the students that accreditation were granted to the law school despite its inadequacies,
the public interest would be harmed by this concern for the students.
91.
See STANDARDS, supra note 36, at iv.
92. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 33.
93.
Id. at 10-16.
94. Id.
95.
STANDARDS, supra note 36.
96. The DOE recognizes the Council of the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar and the Accreditation Committee as the accrediting bodies for
legal education and it imposes some requirements that focus on the protection of students
as consumers of legal education. The Department of Education mandate includes certain
specific protections of students' and taxpayers' money. The ABA, of course, must meet
the DOE requirements if it seeks to be a recognized accrediting agency. The ABA is
able to meet these requirements without threatening its obligation to put the public
interest first. Having DOE recognition, however, does not reduce the ABA's obligation
to the public. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.

profession.9 7 If anything, it imposes burdens on them in the interest of
the general public and the courts.98
Accreditation might also secondarily take into careful consideration a
few other interests, including those of the legal profession. The bar turned
over to the academy its traditional role in training the next generation of
the legal profession, but it retains a clear interest in how future lawyers
are educated.99 Not all such secondary interests are as legitimate. The
use of ABA accreditation to benefit the faculty or staff of law schools or
the financial interests of universities, for example, would be difficult to
justify. 0 0
The structure of the ABA accreditation process promotes the participation
of the judiciary, practicing bar and public, as well as the academy.' O'
The Council also has a student representative.'0 2 This mix of membership
is a strength in that it provides multiple perspectives focused on the
preparation of lawyers. It also carries the risk that accreditation could be
diverted from its primary public purpose.
Where the interests of the public and the interests of students (or others)
conflict, however, an accreditation system directly tied to licensing would
be obligated to first consider and protect the interests of the public. Tying
the education requirement to licensing, after all, is justified on the
basis that the public will be harmed by inadequately trained and tested
97. Presumably one of the reasons for ABA accreditation is to prevent law schools
from making graduation "too easy" for students, resulting in inadequate preparation for
legal practice. See supra note 90.
98. The legal profession set up the accreditation system, but it cannot legitimately
operate it to protect its own interest by, for example, reducing the number of students
graduating from law schools artificially to restrain competition among lawyers.
99. See authorities cited infra note 110.
100.
The use of ABA accreditation for the purpose of serving the interests of faculty
would not promote the public interest, and might well indirectly harm it. That is
different than when accreditation incidentally helps the faculty in pursuit of the public
interest. For example, reducing the student-faculty ratio of law schools can improve the
education of students and thereby serve the public interest by allowing clinical courses,
better instruction in legal writing instruction, small group instruction and closer attention
to individual students. See STANDARDS, supra note 36, Standard 402 and Interpretations
402-1 to 402-4 describing in great detail the way to calculate the student-faculty ratio
and determining that a ratio of 20-1 is presumptively in compliance with the Standards.
Id. at Interpretation 402-2(1). Reducing the student-faculty ratio may incidentally
improve the professional lives of faculty by reducing student loads, enhancing the
teaching environment and allowing work on their own projects. The student-public
interest is a legitimate reason for the ABA rule, the faculty interest is not.
101.
The Accreditation Committee and the Council both have membership of all
four groups. A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, SECTION
BYLAWS at Article IV (the Council) and Article VIII (the Accreditation Committee)
(2006), availableat http://www.abanet.org/legaled/section/bylaws.html.
102. Id.
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attorneys. °3 Therefore, the public interests deserve the primary
consideration.
The interests of the public and of students are, for the most part,
consistent in the long run. Requiring that students be treated with care
and respect may, for example, help them to become better, more
considerate professionals.' °4 It is easy to imagine, however, circumstances
in which a conflict between public and student interests could arise in
accreditation. Suppose, for example, that it would be possible to substantially
reduce the costs of legal education but doing so would significantly
reduce the quality of attorneys and increase the likelihood of inadequately
trained lawyers. This trade-off might be acceptable for, and even good
for, students, but it would be inappropriate for the licensing system, and
hence accreditation tied to licensing, to accept this reform. Because
there is no shortage of attorneys in the United States," 5 a reform that
would produce attorneys faster or at lower cost, but less well prepared,
would not be in the interest of the public. There is undoubtedly some
public interest in having lawyers with the lowest possible debt following
law school, 10 6 but that interest would certainly be overcome by the
interest in well-prepared lawyers.
103.
See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
104.
Professor Larry Krieger, and others, have emphasized the destructive elements
of law school and the legal profession and that law schools can help students prepare for
the stresses of the legal profession. Lawrence S. Krieger, Essay on Professionalismand
PersonalSatisfaction: the Inseparabilityof Professionalism and PersonalSatisfaction:
Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 425 (2005). See
Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999). Problem solving,
therapeutic jurisprudence, holistic lawyering and similar approaches may be one
mechanism by which law students, lawyers and clients can avoid such stresses and enjoy
more productive and healthy relationships. Susan Daicoff, Law as a HealingProfession:
The "ComprehensiveLaw Movement", 6 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 1(2006).
105. See Jonathan Macey, Ethics in CorporateRepresentation:Lawyers, Self-regulation,
and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1093 (2005); Thomas D.
Morgan, Real World Pressures on Professionalism, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
409, 410 (2001).
106.
The public interest in lawyers with low student debt includes the possibility
that those with great debt will be unduly driven to charge clients for unnecessary service,
charge higher prices or decline to engage in pro bono activities. A.B.A. COMM'N ON
LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A
BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE 14-28 (2003); Omar J. Arcia, Comment, Objections,

Administrative Difficulties and Alternatives to Mandatory Pro Bono Legal Services in
Florida,22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 771, 796 (1995); L. Kinvin Wroth, Access to Justice: The
Problem of Law Student Debt, 30 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 28 (2004). It is far from clear that

In this way an accreditation system that is closely tied with licensing
has different obligations than does an accreditation system responsible to
a learned society, a professional teachers' group or even the Department
of Education. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS), for
example, should feel less constrained about promoting the interests of
law schools, students or faculty, perhaps even at the expense of the
public.° 7 The legitimacy of the AALS membership (accreditation) process
depends not on protecting the public, but rather on the shared values of
its law school members. 0 8 Such is not the case with the ABA.' 019

the level of student debt is actually related to any of these problems. See Ken Myers,
Despite Debt and Lure of Firms, Pro Bono Work Is Catching on, 18 NAT'L L.J. A18,
col.1 (Oct. 16, 1995).
107.
Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, BYLAWS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP Bylaw § 6-1(a) (2006)
[hereinafter AALS BYLAWS] (membership requirements "are intended to reflect the

Association's core values and distinctive role as a membership association, while
according appropriate respect for the autonomy of its member schools"), available at
http://www.aals.org/about-handbook-requirements.php#6. These core values include:
(i) a faculty composed primarily of full-time teachers/scholars who constitute a
self-governing intellectual community engaged in the creation and dissemination
of knowledge about law, legal processes, and legal systems, and who are
devoted to fostering justice and public service in the legal community;
(ii) scholarship, academic freedom, and diversity of viewpoints;
(iii) a rigorous academic program built upon strong teaching in the context of a
dynamic curriculum that is both broad and deep;
(iv) a diverse faculty and staff hired, promoted, and retained based on meeting
and supporting high standards of teaching and scholarship and in accordance
with principles of non-discrimination; and
(v) selection of students based upon intellectual ability and personal
potential for success in the study and practice of law, through a fair and
non-discriminatory process designed to produce a diverse student body and a
broadly representative legal profession.
Id. at Bylaw § 6-1(b).
108. Id.
109. See STANDARDS, supra note 36, at viii. The Preamble to the ABA Standards
begins:
The Standards for Approval of Law Schools of the American Bar Association are
founded primarily on the fact that law schools are the gateway to the legal profession.
They are minimum requirements designed, developed, and implemented for the
purpose of advancing the basic goal of providing a sound program of legal
education. The graduates of approved law schools can become members of the bar
in all United States jurisdictions, representing all members of the public in
important interests.
Id.
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V. LEGITIMATE BASES FOR ACCREDITATION IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST

With the public interest as the focus of ABA accreditation, three legitimate
bases for regulation of law schools (or other professional schools) can be
identified."1 ' The first is ensuring that law graduates understand the
basic skills, knowledge and obligations of lawyers. Many of the ABA
Standards focus exactly on this kind of regulation. For example, Standard
302 provides that a law school must require each student to receive
"substantial instruction" in such topics and skills as substantive law, legal
analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, oral communication,
writing in a legal context, and professional responsibility. I' Another
example, of a different character, is Standard 303, which requires that
law schools "monitor students' academic progress and achievement from
the beginning of and periodically throughout their studies."'1 12 The
110. James P. White, History of the Administration of the American Law School
Accreditation Process, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 438 (2000). For other views on the legitimacy
and history of American law schools and accreditation, see 1-2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION INTHE UNITED STATES (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999); ALBERT J.HARNO, LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1953); FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G.
ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981); and ROBERT STEVENS, LAW

SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION INAMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983).
111.
STANDARDS, supra note 36, Standard 302(a). Specifically, "a law school must
ensure each student receive[s] substantial instruction in" the following subject areas:
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to effective and
responsible participation in the legal profession;
(2) legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral
communication;
(3) writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous writing
experience in the first year and at least one additional rigorous
writing experience after the first year;
(4) other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for effective and
responsible participation in the legal profession; and
(5) the history, goals, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal
profession and its members.
Id.
112. Id. at Standard 303. In full, this Standard provides:
(a) A law school shall have and adhere to sound academic standards, including
clearly defined standards for good standing and graduation.
(b) A law school shall monitor students' academic progress and achievement
from the beginning of and periodically throughout their studies.
(c) A law school shall not continue the enrollment of a student whose inability
to do satisfactory work is sufficiently manifest so that the student's

Interpretation of this Standard requires that the scholastic achievement
be "evaluated by examinations of suitable length and complexity, papers,
projects, or by assessment of performances of students in the role of
lawyers." ' 3 This Standard should help protect the public by ensuring
that students are tested throughout their law school careers which,
presumably, should help assure the public that they are actually learning

something in law school.
A second legitimate basis for accreditation in the public interest is to
avoid the harmful effects of Gresham's Law.' 14 Accreditation should
seek to prevent unproductive competition that harms the quality of legal
education and the public interest. Several of the Standards do just that.
An example of this is the detailed regulation of internship placements in
Standard 305.11 That Standard requires careful supervision of such
internships, appropriate resources for teaching these intemships, evaluating
and training field placement supervisors, opportunities for student
reflection and the like. 16
continuation in school would inculcate false hopes, constitute economic
exploitation, or detrimentally affect the education of other students.
113.
Id. at Interpretation 303-1 ("Scholastic achievement of students shall be
evaluated by examinations of suitable length and complexity, papers, projects, or by
assessment of performances of students in the role of lawyers.").
114.
In this sense, accreditation is appropriate to preclude good, solid educational
practices form being inappropriately threatened by bad, inadequate practices.
115.
See STANDARDS, supra note 36, at Standard 305 (permitting academic credit
for study outside the classroom under certain, particularized conditions).
116. Id. For example, part (e) provides:
A field placement program shall include:
(1) a clear statement of the goals and methods, and a demonstrated relationship
between those goals and methods to the program in operation;
(2) adequate instructional resources, including faculty teaching in and supervising
the program who devote the requisite time and attention to satisfy program
goals and are sufficiently available to students;
(3) a clearly articulated method of evaluating each student's academic performance
involving both a faculty member and the field placement supervisor;
(4) a method for selecting, training, evaluating, and communicating with field
placement supervisors;
(5) periodic on-site visits or their equivalent by a faculty member if the field
placement program awards four or more academic credits (or equivalent) for
field work in any academic term or if on-site visits or their equivalent are
otherwise necessary and appropriate;
(6) a requirement that students have successfully completed one academic year
of study prior to participation in the field placement program;
(7) opportunities for student reflection on their field placement experience, through a
seminar, regularly scheduled tutorials, or other means of guided reflection.
Where a student can earn four or more academic credits (or equivalent) in
the program for fieldwork, the seminar, tutorial, or other means of guided
reflection must be provided contemporaneously.
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Before the adoption of this Standard some law schools were sending
students for semesters away from the law school at poorly supervised
and educationally suspect internships."'7 Everyone seemed to have an
interest in a nearly corrupt system."'8 The law school was receiving
tuition for which it was providing little in return. 19 Students were
obtaining credit for little academic work and the agencies and offices
(placements) were receiving free law clerks.1 "'
Not only was this circumstance not good for the students at the
schools permitting this, but it became a case of bad programs harming
("driving out") good ones. Schools not participating in these weak
programs were pressured by their students and by internship placements
to forgo serious supervision, to permit semesters away without academic
content and to limit the reports required from on-site supervisors. 2 '
Because the credit (nominal value) was received whether or not there
was any serious learning going on (intrinsic value), the solid programs
were being threatened by weak programs. It was appropriate for accreditation
to limit this harmful form of competition for the weakest internship

programs.
A third legitimate basis for accreditation in the public interest is the
indirect assurance of quality of law school education. It would be ideal
if law schools and other professional schools could rely exclusively on
measuring outputs. Truly effective output measures in the professions
would have two parts: they would compare a school's students against
absolute norms of adequate skills, knowledge, values and the like; and
Id.
117. Regarding internship practices, see Peter A. Joy, Evolution of ABA Standards
Relating to Externships: Steps in the Right Direction?,10 CLINICAL L. REv. 681 (2004).
118. The system was "corrupt" in the sense that, as one practitioner described it to
me, law schools were "taking students' tuition money with one hand and pointing them
out the door with the other hand." Personal conversation with Richard Nahstoll (Former
Chairman, ABA Accreditation Committee).
119. Students in unsupervised internships have almost no instruction costs to the
law school.
120. The effort to wring out these abuses was the subject of considerable debate.
See Joy, supra note 117.
121.
Students from weak programs were able to achieve academic credit without as
much work as those (sometimes in the same office) from strong programs. As an
associate dean in those days I heard students in internships that required hard work and
close supervision complain to their schools that they were being disadvantaged.
Furthermore, some law office placements complained that the supervision by faculty at
good programs was burdensome compared with the free-wheeling operation of an
unsupervised weak program.

they would measure the relative benefit the school gives its students
(value added). If truly reliable, testable measures existed, of course, there
would be little need for accreditation because licensing authorities could
depend directly on the output measures to assess the appropriateness of
licensing any given candidate.
Output measures used in law schools have generally been bar examination
results, placement information and general information about the acceptability
of graduates to the bench and bar. Of these, bar exam results have been
of special importance. 22 At the same time that there are calls for more
reliance on outcome measures, ironically, the use of bar results as an
outcome measure in ABA accreditation has become more controversial.
There is considerable interest within education, including legal education,
in developing better output measures and those improvements have the
potential for vastly changing accreditation. This sea change in accreditation
would require three elements: clear definitions of required professional
competencies; reliable, valid and fair assessment of those competencies;
and rigorous application of the assessment to students and to law schools.
Such an approach also has the promise of significantly improving the bar
exam as an element of licensing. As difficult as this process appears,
other professions have 12taken
steps that suggest that there is now real
3
promise it can succeed.
In the absence of good output measures accreditation must depend on
a combination of output and input factors. Many of the existing accreditation
Standards deal with input measures. For example, the quality of students
admitted to the law school, 124 the quality of faculty 125 and the structure
of the curriculum 126 are all forms of input measures.
Accreditation is also intended to ensure that there is a system in place
that can be relied upon over time to continue to produce legitimate
quality education. Direct measures of what is happening in law school
122. Standard 301(a) provides, "a law school shall maintain an educational program
that prepares its students for admission to the bar, and effective and responsible participation
in the legal profession." Standard 501(b) ties admissions and bar success together: "A
law school shall maintain an educational program that prepares its students for admission
to the bar, and effective and responsible participation in the legal profession."
123.

NAT'L ARcHnTEcTURAL ACCREDITING BD., NAAB PROCEDURES FOR ACCREDITATION

(2006), http://www.naab.org/usr-doc/2006_Procedures.doc. Regarding medical accreditation
criteria, see STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS LEADING
TO THE M.D. DEGREE, supra note 88. For an excellent review of the use of assessment
of outcomes in medicine, see Ronald M. Epstein, Assessment in Medical Education, 356
NEW ENG. J. MED. 387 (2007).

124.
Standards 501-508 deal with admissions tests and admission of students.
125.
Standards 401-405 deal with a variety of issues related to faculty.
126.
Standards 301-307 deal with a number of issues related to the curriculum and
course of study.
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occur infrequently, usually only once every seven years. Part of ensuring
that this quality can endure is to consider measures of a school's
infrastructure, including the library,'2 7 facilities'2 8 and finances. 2 9
A substantial number of the ABA accreditation Standards relate to the
infrastructure of a school. The Standards are important to ensure that
good quality is going to continue, but these Standards deserve careful
and continuing review. The review should consider whether law schools
are being unnecessarily burdened without improving the quality of
lawyers available to the public, and whether law schools are being
prevented from finding efficiencies or competing in areas that are not
necessary for preparation of good attorneys.
Input measures and indirect measures that include infrastructure are
legitimate concems of accreditation given the current limitations on direct
measures and outputs. The legitimacy of such measures, however, in
promoting the public interest becomes more doubtful as the connection
between the input or the infrastructure to the quality of the attorneys
available to the public becomes more distant. Having an adequate teaching
library would have a fairly direct impact on the quality of instruction for
students. 30 Having a private office for each faculty member has a more
indirect and less obvious impact and requires, therefore, greater justification. 3 '
Not all of the current Standards are clearly legitimate in terms of
directly protecting the public by assuring quality legal education, avoiding
Gresham's Law or taking account of essential input measures. Everything
can, of course, be connected in some indirect way to the public interest,
but the legitimacy of the connection to accreditation is the issue. Some
of the Standards not connected to the public interest are of little concern,

127. See Standards 601-606 and 702.
128. See Standards 701-703.
129. A number of Standards deal with various financial aspects of the law school
and resources for its programs. See, e.g., 201(a), 201(b), 210(c) and 601(b).
130. A teaching library is necessary for students to learn basic research skills, to
prepare for class and to undertake writing assignments required for class and to become
familiar with basic legal materials. Whether the Standards should require a research, as
opposed to teaching, library is a matter of some debate. It would legitimately be part of
the Standards only if law schools were required to have a research mission. See infra
notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
131.
The justification, presumably, is that private offices encourage confidential
conversations with students and increase faculty efficiency. The degree to which that is
true should be established more clearly if the ABA accreditation Standards are going to
include them.

but others are of considerable debate.132 For example, Standard 511
provides that a law school must "provide all its students, regardless of
enrollment or scheduling option, with basic student services, including...
an active career counseling service to assist students in making sound
career choices and obtaining employment. ' 133 This Standard is probably
unobjectionable in that it does little harm to the public interest, but its
best marginally connected to the ABA's obligation to the
legitimacy is at1 34
public interest.
Examples of inappropriate use of accreditation to avoid the harmful
effects of Gresham's Law would focus on restraining competition where
the competition is not harmful to academic quality. Some people believe
that an example of such an inappropriate use are all of the Standards related
to "terms of employment."13' 5 These Standards, for example, require137a
tenure system for faculty; 136 security of employment for clinical faculty;
and other protections for librarians,138 deans 139 and others. 4 ' This debate
The matters of more serious debate currently center around "conditions and
132.
terms of employment." See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
STANDARDS, supra note 36, at Standard 511. This Standard says in full:
133.
A law school shall provide all its students, regardless of enrollment or scheduling
option, with basic student services, including maintenance of accurate student
records, academic advising and counseling, financial aid counseling, and an active
career counseling service to assist students in making sound career choices and
obtaining employment. If a law school does not provide these types of student
services directly, it must demonstrate that its students have reasonable access to
such services from the university of which it is a part or from other sources.
Id.
134.
It is possible that the career services office requirement serves the public
interest by helping reduce the "mismatch" between students and employers that would
occur without the career services office. That those offices significantly reduce such
mismatches is an essential assumption for the Standard.
135. AM. LAW DEANS ASS'N, STATEMENT OF THE ALDA BOARD AT THE HEARING OF
THE ABA ACCREDITATION TASK FORCE (Jan. 5, 2007).
136.
Standard 405(b), for example, provides, "A law school shall have an
established and announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure of which
Appendix I herein is an example but is not obligatory."
137.
Standard 405(c) provides, in part,
A law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security
of position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites reasonably
similar to those provided other full-time faculty members. A law school may
require these faculty members to meet standards and obligations reasonably similar to
those required of other full-time faculty members.
138.
Standard 603(d) provides, "Except in extraordinary circumstances, a law
library director shall hold a law faculty appointment with security of faculty position."
139.
Standard 206(c) says, "Except in extraordinary circumstances, a dean shall also
hold appointment as a member of the faculty with tenure."
140.
Standard 405(d) provides that,
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over the terms of employment illustrates the difficulty that can arise in
determining what is legitimate competition. While one person may see an
important indirect mechanism to ensure that clinical instruction is of high
quality, someone else will see the same regulation as inappropriately
limiting the flexibility of law schools to staff their programs in a way
that is most efficient and effective for that law school. The public interest is
either enhanced by providing stable clinical faculty that promote good
clinical education, for example, or it is harmed by the inflexibility and
results in clinical programs that are not sufficiently attuned to the
immediate needs of the law school programs.
The debate also reflects the difficulty in using accreditation Standards
to promote universally agreed upon goals. For example, there is little
question but that academic freedom is essential to any strong law school
program. Successful law school instruction relies on the open and free
exchange and clash of ideas. Challenging, unpopular and new ideas
cannot thrive unless academic freedom exists and can be relied on within
the law school. Law school constantly deals with the most controversial
subjects because almost all of them have important legal aspects. Members
of law school faculties will inevitably upset powerful forces in the
government, the corporate world, foundations, religious groups and the
press. Some of those upset with law faculty will be in a position to
apply enormous pressure on universities through political coercion or
threats to funding, or directly through the board of the institution.
Therefore, protecting academic freedom is in the interest of the public.
The question arises, however, whether tenure is necessary to protect
academic freedom."' If it is, then a tenure system is in the public interest
because it implements the essential value of protecting academic freedom
which in the long run is necessary for acceptable law school instruction.

A law school shall afford legal writing teachers such security of position and other
rights and privileges of faculty membership as may be necessary to (1) attract and
retain a faculty that is well qualified to provide legal writing instruction as
required by Standard 302(a)(2), and (2) safeguard academic freedom.
141.
If academic freedom can, in the long run, be protected without a tenure system,
then law schools might be given a range of options for protecting academic freedom.
The difficulty in this area is that trying to protect academic freedom after the fact is not
very helpful. Furthermore, the "chilling effect" on academic freedom from attacks on
those with unpopular views makes a tenure system of particular importance where, as in
law, scholarship and teaching may offend powerful interests.

VI. INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Another difficult question arises concerning innovation and variances
from the requirements of the Standards. The public is undoubtedly served
by educational innovations that work. It is not served by innovations
that seriously interfere with the education of students. In some respects
the interest of the public in innovation in professional education is like
innovation in medical treatment. Standard treatments assure a level of
quality given current medical knowledge, but a new or experimental
treatment carries the promise of improvement.
The ABA accreditation system allows innovation in two ways. First,
many of the Standards allow considerable, and unrecognized, latitude to
law schools. For example, the curricular requirements of the Standards
are sufficiently general to allow a great deal of experimentation with the
academic program of the law school.' 42 It is interesting to note that
despite the fact that the Standards say very little about the first year of
law school, the variations among law schools in the first year curriculum
are not great.
Even where the Standards are specific, however, a law school seeking
to undertake an innovative program that would otherwise violate the
142.
The curricular requirements are very general, in contrast with much more
detailed regulation in other areas. Rather than requiring specific courses, they set out general
areas of instruction. Standard 301 requires "an educational program that prepares... students
for admission to the bar, and effective and responsible participation in the legal
profession." The Standard that deals with most of the curricular requirements is Standard
302. It provides:
(a) A law school shall require that each student receive substantial instruction in:
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to effective and
responsible participation in the legal profession;
(2) legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral
communication;
(3) writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous writing
experience in the first year and at least one additional rigorous
writing experience after the first year;
(4) other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession; and
(5) the history, goals, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities
of the legal profession and its members.
(b) A law school shall offer substantial opportunities for:
(1) live-client or other real-life practice experiences, appropriately
supervised and designed to encourage reflection by students on their
experiences and on the values and responsibilities of the legal
profession, and the development of one's ability to assess his or her
performance and level of competence;
(2) student participation in pro bono activities; and
(3) small group work through seminars, directed research, small classes,
or collaborative work.
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Standards may seek a variance under Standard 802.143 That Standard
provides approval of experimental programs when they are conducted in
a way that is consistent with sound educational policy, good research
design and ethical obligations. 1" This provision is relatively new and
attempts to ensure that legitimate, high-quality educational experiments
can proceed, while protecting the public from inadequate preparation
1 45
from some graduates that could result from a failed experiment.
Variances may also be used inappropriately in an attempt to obtain a
competitive advantage in a regulated field. For example, if a school
were to seek a variance that permitted its students to graduate with only
four semesters of instruction, rather than six, it would have the potential
for a substantial Gresham's Law-like market advantage by being able to
offer the nominal value of a law school diploma without requiring the
full intrinsic value of legal education. Or, if a school sought a variance
143.
Standard 802 provides:
A law school proposing to offer a program of legal education a portion of which is
inconsistent with a Standard may apply for a variance. If the Council finds that
the proposal is nevertheless consistent with the general purposes of the Standards,
the Council may grant the variance, may impose conditions, and shall impose time
limits it considers appropriate. Council may terminate a variance prior to the end
of the stated time limit if the school fails to comply with any conditions imposed
by the Council. As a general rule, the duration of a variance should not exceed three
years.
144. Interpretation 802-1 provides the following:
Variances are generally limited to proposals based on one or more of the following:
(a) a response to extraordinary circumstances that would create extreme
hardship for students or for an approved law school; or
(b) an experimental program based on all of the following:
(1) good reason to believe that there is a likelihood of success;
(2) high quality experimental design;
(3) clear and measurable criteria for assessing the success of the
experimental program;
(4) strong reason to believe that the benefits of the experiment will be
greater than its risks; and
(5) adequately informed participation by students involved in the
experiment.
STANDARDS, supra note 36.
145.
Interpretation 802-2 sets out the information a school must provide when seeking a
variance:
A school applying for a variance has the burden of demonstrating that the variance
should be granted. The application should include, at a minimum, the following:
(a) a precise statement of the variance sought;
(b) an explanation of the bases and reasons for the variance; and
(c) additional information needed to support the application.

from the requirement that entering students take the LSAT or similar
examination, in a competitive market they might be able to claim that
they were offering easier admission than any other accredited law school
could. Unless there were a strong experimental reason to permit such a
variance, it would be akin to spot zoning in that it would allow one law
school to have an advantage unavailable to others in the area. In some
circumstances this would invite the problems of Gresham's Law in which
schools would seek variances to have the nominal advantage of ABA
approval without the costs of the intrinsic public benefits of accreditation.146
VII. ISSUES CONCERNING FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AND PUBLICATION

Several of the ABA accreditation Standards seem to require that law
schools have a faculty scholarship commitment. Standard 401, for example,
requires that the faculty possess "a high degree of confidence, as
demonstrated by its . . . scholarly research and writing."' 147 Standard
402 is somewhat ambiguous but may require that the full-time faculty be
large enough to permit opportunities for the faculty to "conduct scholarly
research."' 148 Standard 404 requires the law school to have policies
146.

For a discussion of the changes in the variance provisions of the Standards, see

A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMMENTARY ON
REVISIONS TO STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2005-2006 at 13-14 (2006),

http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/adoptedstandards2006/standardsreviewcommen
tary2005-06approvedchanges.pdf (last visited May 20, 2007).
147.
Standard 401 provides:
A law school shall have a faculty whose qualifications and experience are appropriate
to the stated mission of the law school and to maintaining a program of legal
education consistent with the requirements of Standards 301 and 302. The faculty
shall possesses a high degree of competence, as demonstrated by its education,
experience in teaching or practice, teaching effectiveness, and scholarly research
and writing.
148. Standard 402 provides:
(a) A law school shall have a sufficient number of full-time faculty to fulfill the
requirements of the Standards and meet the goals of its educational program.
The number of full-time faculty necessary depends on:
(1) the size of the student body and the opportunity for students to meet
individually with and consult faculty members;
(2) the nature and scope of the educational program; and
(3) the opportunities for the faculty adequately to fulfill teaching
obligations, conduct scholarly research, and participate
effectively in the governance of the law school and in
service to the legal profession and the public.
(b) A full-time faculty member is one whose primary professional employment
is with the law school and who devotes substantially all working time during
the academic year to the responsibilities described in Standard 404(a), and
whose outside professional activities, if any, are limited to those that relate
to major academic interests or enrich the faculty member's capacity as a
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regarding its faculty's "responsibilities in teaching, scholarship, [and]

service .

"149

Law school scholarly research serves many important functions. It is
the location of most of the "pure research" in law, that is, research not
required by or connected to specific cases or disputes.15 ° It provides a
very wide range of thinking and creativity regarding the law, the legal
system and lawyers. It sometimes results in a greater understanding of
the law, provides the opportunity to try creative solutions to problems
before they need to be implemented by courts and legislatures, is an
opportunity to consider the legal problems that society will face in the
future and is sufficiently removed from the day-to-day operation of the
legal profession to allow a somewhat detached commentary on the

scholar and teacher, are of service to the legal profession and the public
generally, and do not unduly interfere with one's responsibility as a faculty
member.
149. Standard 404 provides:
(a) A law school shall establish policies with respect to a full-time faculty
member's responsibilities in teaching, scholarship, service to the law school
community, and professional activities outside the law school. The policies
need not seek uniformity among faculty members, but should address:
(1) Faculty teaching responsibilities, including carrying a fair share of the
law school's course offerings, preparing for classes, being available for
student consultation, participating in academic advising, and creating an
atmosphere in which students and faculty may voice opinions and
exchange ideas;
(2) Research and scholarship, and integrity in the conduct of scholarship,
including appropriate use of student research assistants, acknowledgment of
the contributions of others, and responsibility of faculty members to
keep abreast of developments in their specialties;
(3) Obligations to the law school and university community, including
participation in the governance of the law school;
(4) Obligations to the profession, including working with the practicing
bar and judiciary to improve the profession; and
(5) Obligations to the public, including participation in pro bono activities.
150. See Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professoras Fiduciary:What Duties Do We
Owe to Our Students?, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 753 (2004)
("because we generally do not conduct our scholarly work for clients, we are not
restricted in our work, as are practicing members of the bar, by professional
obligations to select and to advocate legal positions designed to advance our
client's interests to the fullest extent possible within the bounds of the law.").

profession as well as the law. 5' These benefits, of course, accrue to
society and the profession more than to individual law students.
Modem scholarly publication has been criticized by thoughtful judges
as being unrelated to the real needs of the law, written only for other law
professors and essentially irrelevant. 5 2 My conversations with excellent
lawyers and judges, the very members of the practicing profession we
would hope would be consumers of some legal scholarship, cause concern
that too little scholarship is of immediate value to them in improving the
law.153 Despite these worrisome criticisms, however, for this article I
assume that in the long run at least legal scholarship has important
public utility. 154 If that assumption is not true, then the remainder of this
section is unnecessary; having an ABA license-related accreditation
requirement related to research would be very hard to justify.
It is less clear what law students receive from their schools' research
missions. Some believe that they receive better teaching, although that
is a matter of dispute. The studies that have been done that attempt to
correlate quality of teaching and level of faculty research activity have
not consistently demonstrated such a correlation.' 55 It has not been
demonstrated very well, therefore, that research in fact improves teaching.
151.
Philip F. Postlewaite, Publish or Perish: The Paradox, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157,
158 (2000) (suggesting publication serves the academy, the student body, the general
public, and the profession).
152. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing DisjunctionBetween Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 42-43 (1992). For a discussion of the issues
raised by Judge Edwards see Symposium: Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. 91 (1992).
153. Schuwerk, supra note 150, at 763 (reviewing the response to Judge Edwards'
article).
154. That may be a somewhat unwarranted assumption, of course. The citations by
the Supreme Court are small and probably declining. Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffery B.
Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34
UCLA L. REv. 131, 134 (1986) (noting low level of citations to law review articles).
Follow ups on the article found a continuing trend. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of
Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2000) ("we
find a continuing decline in number of times the Court cited legal periodicals."); Louis J.
Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051 (1991) (noting again the low
percentage of law review citations).
155.
Professor Benjamin Barton recently conducted a study comparing five research
measures with law faculty teaching evaluations. He concluded, "none of these five measures
of research productivity correlate with teaching evaluations." Benjamin Barton, Is There
a Correlation Between Scholarly Productivity, Scholarly Influence and Teaching
Effectiveness in American Law Schools? An Empirical Study 16 (lst Ann. Conf. on
Empirical Legal Studies, July 1, 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/ abstract= 913421.
Professor Barton noted that his conclusions are consistent with fifty years of studies
that have been done that correlate quality of teaching generally and level of research.
Three studies were meta-analysis or collections of other studies. "Overall, these
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Students may also benefit from the new ideas that might be implemented
while they are practicing and from the general improvement in the law
and legal profession that result from excellent legal research.' 5 6 It is fair
to say, however, that most law students would not voluntarily choose to
pay for law school research missions.' 57 This may be different for students
in some elite or near-elite law schools where the reputation related to
research activities may be sufficient to improve the employment prospects
of students. For the majority of law students, such benefits are far from
obvious.
The question arises of whether accreditation that focuses on the public
interest (licensing) legitimately can require law schools to have faculties
engaged in scholarship and publication.'5 8 The answer in part depends
on the operation of Gresham's Law.
This is not an idle question because the research mission of most law
schools is quite expensive. It results in substantial reductions in the
teaching loads of faculty, libraries with resources many times what
would be required for a simple teaching mission, and a variety of
support services for research. It also probably results in faculty salaries
that are higher than they would be if the school were focusing on
teaching alone.' 59 The salaries for groups of faculty without research
three overviews establish that there is either no correlation or a slight positive correlation
between research productivity and teaching." Id. at 2. Similarly, two studies looking at
law school teaching reached somewhat inconsistent results, but at best did not find any
strong correlation between teaching quality and research productivity. Id. at 3.
156.
Schuwerk, supra note 150, at 753.
157. But see David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 993, 999 (1991) (an advantage to students of faculty writing is that professors will
not be able to "foster critical analytical skills [in students if they do not write and thereby
allow their] own skills [to] atrophy").
158. This is, of course, a different question than whether the AALS can legitimately
demand such a commitment to scholarly activities because its legitimacy comes from the
shared values that include scholarship. See supra note 108.
159. It is impossible to know exactly what a market for teaching-only faculty would
be. The lower salaries currently paid to most legal writing instructors may suggest what
teaching-only faculty would be paid, although there is at least some suggestion that these
salaries reflect other factors. See Jan M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women, Writing
& Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551 (2001); Kristin
B. Gerdy, A Snapshot of Legal Research and Writing Programs through the Lens of the
2002 LWI and ALWD Survey, 9 LEGAL WRITING 227 (2003). If large numbers of schools
looked for teaching-only faculty, there would possibly be better information about
teaching "stars" who could command substantial salaries based on their teaching
excellence. In the absence of schools seeking these non-publishing teachers, or if good
information about teaching were not available, then faculty salaries for pure teachers

obligations, just teaching, are often considerably lower than faculty with
research obligations. 6 °
Law schools are unusual among graduate and professional schools in
that the vast majority of research and scholarship in law schools is funded
by tuition.' 6 ' In medical schools, science and engineering and many social
science disciplines, the majority of research is funded by outside sources,
grants and contracts. Some private funds may be donated specifically for
research, but those funds seldom cover the cost of research. In statesupported law schools, it is possible that the taxpayers are supporting the
research mission through the tax subsidy to the law school. The declining
state support for public law schools in most states suggests that even in
public law schools, a substantial portion of the funding for faculty
research comes from tuition payments.' 62
The tuition that is used to cover legal research is, for most students,
the equivalent of an involuntary fee that they must pay in order to obtain
a law degree and law instruction. It is not obvious that students are the
ones who should be paying the cost of legal scholarship. They are
might be lower than the current range of faculty salaries driven to a considerable extent
by publication expectation.
160. I estimate the substantial reduction in costs from these factors could include:
possible reduction in full-time faculty by up to 40% (to provide the same number of
courses taught by full-time faculty: one extra course in fall and spring semesters per faculty
instead of a research expectation, and a "summer course" instead of "summer
research grants," assuming that sabbatical and other reduced loads would not change,
but that there would be some increase in governance responsibilities); possible 25% reduction
in per-faculty compensation, although this is speculative (see supra note 159); faculty
staff support service reduction of perhaps 30% (resulting from the reduced number of
faculty and the reduced pull on the staff for research purposes); reduction in library
expenses of perhaps 25% (a significant reduction of library collection expenditures, staff
support for research and space as the library provides teaching resources only, and does
not try to have a faculty research collection); and a small (possibly 10%) reduction in
general administrative support. These estimates are based in a general way on the law
school reports of expenditures reported in A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, FISCAL TAKE OFFS 2006 (2007) (the ABA distributes to law
schools, on a confidential basis, data that are taken from the Annual Questionnaire of
the ABA that details the sources of support).
161.
The funding for research in law schools comes from a variety of sources.
There are a few grants or donors who specify a research purpose for their donations.
Other donors provide money without specifying its use, and those funds may also go for
research (although, presumably, they could also be used for instruction, scholarships or
the like). In other cases there are indirect student tuition sources, including university
"research grants" that come from general student tuition.
162.
At least two public law schools, Virginia and Michigan, have gone completely
without state subvention. Denis Binder, The ChangingParadigmin PublicLegal Education,
8 Loy. J. PuB. INT. L. 1, 2-15 (2006). Even where there is some state support, the
proportion of law school expenses coming from tax support is declining. See John A.
Sebert, The Cost and Financingof Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 516 (2002).
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generally borrowing the money to do this and they are the least able of
all those in the profession to pay for it. 163 At the same time, they are the
currently available source of funds for much of this activity. It would,
however, be possible for some law schools to escape this fee for their
students by declining to have a research mission, if that were permitted
by the accreditation Standards.
The argument for an ABA license-related research requirement rests
on several assumptions. First, the assumption is made that research will
serve the public interest by being the source of "pure" research in law.
The second assumption is that it is appropriate for entrants to the legal
profession to bear the burden of that expense in the cost of their legal
education. Third, the assumption is that the benefit to the public is less
than the increase in costs to students. The argument against an ABA
research requirement is that one or more of these assumptions fails. If,
for example, law school research efforts serve the public interest only
very marginally at great cost to students, then there would not be a good
argument for licensing-related accreditation requiring research.
Because scholarly activities are expensive it is likely that without an
accreditation requirement, a number of accredited schools would no longer
expect to have a significant scholarly or publication mission. If that
were to happen, they could focus on teaching and presumably could
offer instruction at a significantly reduced cost.' 4 Once some schools
started doing that it would be reasonable to expect that it would put
pressure on a large number of schools that are not elite or near-elite.
Because students at schools both with and without research missions
will receive the same JD degree, the bad practice (no research mission)
could begin
to drive out the good practice (schools with a research
165
mission).
Accreditation Standards can prevent this operation of Gresham's Law
from occurring by requiring that all schools have a research mission. If
the tuition students pay for faculty research is in effect a fee, then the
accreditation Standards might be used to ensure that all students pay
163. Id.
164.
The high, and increasing, cost of legal education is the cause of some concern
among experts. See Sebert, supra note 163.
165.
Here the credibility provided by AALS membership/accreditation may be
important to ameliorate the no-research programs driving out research programs. Similarly,
universities with a general commitment to research may insist that their law schools
continue with the research mission even in the face of competition from non-research
schools.

at least some of this fee by requiring that all law schools engage in
significant levels of faculty research and publication.' 66 The question is
whether it is legitimate for a license-related accreditation system to do
so.
Legal education is fortunate to have two well-established accreditation
processes. In addition to the ABA approval process, the Association of
American Law Schools Membership Requirements are a form of
accreditation.1 67 Promoting scholarly publication is one of the core
values of the AALS.' 68 Whatever the legitimacy of the ABA having a
research requirement, the AALS as a membership organization that is a
scholarly society clearly should have such a requirement. One approach
would be to eliminate all, scholarly research requirements from the ABA
Standards and rely on the AALS to promote scholarly research in law
schools. Assuming the AALS would rigorously enforce this core value,
it would provide a substantial incentive for law schools to maintain a
research mission. Such an option might reduce the pressure of Gresham's
Law noted above. Realistically, however, the AALS might be subject to
pressure from some of its member schools to reduce its insistence of
faculty scholarship if they were facing significant competition from nonAALS schools who abandoned anything other than a thin pretense of a
research mission.
For the ABA to impose this research fee on students by means of
accreditation is practically difficult. While such a Standard might prevent
Gresham's Law from driving out or limiting research missions in many
law schools, it is not clear that it would be fair to do so or even successful.
For one thing it would be hard to enforce a research Standard. Indeed,
the current Standards are ambiguous at best in describing the obligation
of accredited law schools to undertake faculty research. 69 It is hard to
imagine removing the ABA accreditation of a law school because it
engaged in inadequate faculty research. If the ABA, as opposed to the

166. Even if ABA accreditation were to require that all ABA approved law schools
have a research mission, the resulting involuntary fee on law students would not be
evenly distributed. Some schools would have an intensive, and expensive, mission,
while other law schools might have a minimal, and much less expensive, mission. At
least in theory, students could choose to attend a less expensive school with minimal
research, but they would not be able to attend an ABA law school with no research
mission.
167.
See AALS BYLAWS, supra note 107.
168.
The AALS "core values" include "scholarship" and "a faculty composed
primarily of full-time teachers/scholars who [are] engaged in the creation... of knowledge
about law, legal processes, and legal systems and institutions." Id.
169. See Standards 401, 402 and 404, supra notes 147-49.
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AALS, 17 1 wishes to establish research obligations for law schools, it should
clearly justify either the educational component of such a requirement or
why the accreditation system can legitimately be used to impose a
research fee on existing students.
VIII. CONCLUSION

It is perhaps an article of faith that well-educated lawyers improve
society and serve the public better than badly educated lawyers. The
educational requirement in most states that ties ABA accreditation to
licensing is intended to help ensure that there are well-educated lawyers.
The close connection of ABA accreditation and licensing, however,
means that it has a special obligation to work in the public interest to
improve legal education first and foremost. The interests of students and
law schools may have a role in accreditation, but not at the expense of
the public interest. Efforts to reduce the costs of legal education, for
example, that also reduce quality are not in the interests of the public.
The ABA accreditation process has improved quality through adopting
and implementing three kinds of Standards. Some Standards deal directly
with the educational process; some do so indirectly by requiring effective
systems to promote continued quality; and some limit the pernicious effects
of Gresham's Law.
In the absence of an accreditation system "any diploma" would do
and, in terms of qualifying to sit for the bar exam, the pressure would be
for "bad practice" to drive out "good education." While the effect of
Gresham's Law can be seen in legal education, for example, in the response
to U.S. News, accreditation has successfully reduced or eliminated some
of the destructive downward spiraling that might have existed.
The different places of the ABA and AALS systems of accreditation
deserve consideration. Although the two organizations have traditionally
had similar requirements for accreditation, perhaps legal education is
outgrowing the need for this duplication. One option is for the ABA to
eliminate its Standards that do not fairly clearly promote the public
interest, and insist on very strong enforcement of those Standards that do
so. This, then, would leave to the AALS enforcing requirements with
less clear connections to the public interest, but directly related to its
obligations to its law school members, students and faculty.
170. The AALS more clearly identifies faculty research as an element in its accreditation
(membership) system and makes it a "core value." See supra note 168 and accompanying
text.

The AALS has adopted "core values" that speak directly to many of
these interests. For example, the AALS focuses on faculty governance,
scholarly research, non-discrimination and diversity, and tenure and
academic freedom. Not all ABA law schools are members of the AALS,
of course, so AALS requirements cannot substitute for ABA Standards
that genuinely protect the public. Such an arrangement has some risk of
subjecting the AALS to the effects of Gresham's Law. Because all ABA
schools (whether or not members of the AALS) would give diplomas
qualifying their graduates to take the bar examination, and because
AALS requirements would cost additional money, some good (AALS)
degrees threatened by the bad (non-AALS) degrees and the AALS might
be under pressure to reduce its membership requirements. Such pressure
now is not significant because there are not dramatic differences in the
requirements of the two organizations.
The challenge to the process remains to focus rigorously on the public
interest in considering Standards that ensure high quality legal education
but permit reasonable levels of flexibility and take advantage of new
technology. The Standards also must promote quality and encourage
competition among law schools, avoid the problems of Gresham's Law
and encourage efficiency and rigor in the educational process.
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